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Abstract:   Over the past several years, substantial research effort has gone into measuring
the efficiency of financial institutions. Many studies have found that inefficiencies are
quite large, on the order of 20% or more of total banking industry costs and about half of
the industry's potential profits. There is no consensus on the sources of the differences in
measured efficiency. This paper examines several possible sources, including differences in
efficiency concept, measurement method, and a number of bank, market, and regulatory
characteristics. We review the existing literature and provide new evidence using data on
U.S. banks over the period 1990-95.
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1. Introduction
Over the past several years, substantial research effort has gone into measuring the efficiency of
financial institutions, particularly commercial banks. The focus has been on estimating an efficient frontier
and measuring the average differences between observed banks and banks on the frontier. Many studies have
found large inefficiencies, on the order of 20% or more of total banking industry costs, and about half of the
industry’s potential profits. There is no consensus on the sources of the differences in measured efficiency.
An obvious next step in the efficiency research program is to determine these sources. This paper focuses on
three sources: (1) differences in the efficiency concept used; (2) differences in measurement methods used to
estimate efficiency within the context of these concepts; and (3) potential correlates of efficiency—bank,
market, and regulatory characteristics that are at least partially exogenous and may explain some of the
efficiency differences that remain after controlling for efficiency concept and measurement method. We
review the existing literature on the sources of efficiency of financial institutions and provide new evidence.
Estimates of efficiency often vary substantially across studies according to the data source, as well as
the efficiency concepts and measurement methods used in the studies. Berger and Humphrey (1997)
documented 130 studies of financial institution efficiency, using data from 21 countries, from multiple time
periods, and from various types of institutions including banks, bank branches, savings and loans, credit
unions, and insurance companies. These variations in the data sets from which efficiencies are measured make
it virtually impossible to determine how important the different efficiency concepts, measurement techniques,
and correlates used are to the outcomes of these studies. Put another way, the sources of differences in
efficiency across financial institutions are concealed from view within an opaque “black box” because the
individual studies simultaneously differ from one another in so many different dimensions.
Our empirical application tries to get around this problem by employing multiple efficiency concepts,
using a number of different measurement methods, and applying a comprehensive set of potential efficiency
correlates to a single data set. We estimate the efficiency of almost 6,000 U.S. commercial banks that were2
in continuous existence over the six-year period 1990-95 and had no missing or questionable data on any of
the variables used. Thus, the differences we observe should reasonably accurately reflect the effects of
changes in the concepts, measurement techniques, and potential correlates that are used, rather than any
differences in the data set to which these assumptions are applied.
We employ three distinct economic efficiency concepts—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit
efficiencies. We analyze the effects of a number of measurement methods, including use of the distribution-
free approach versus the stochastic frontier approach, specification of the Fourier-flexible functional form
versus the translog form, and inclusion of problem loans and financial capital in a number of different ways.
We find that measured efficiency differs across the three efficiency concepts, and that each adds some
independent informational value. A somewhat surprising result is that the choices made concerning efficiency
measurement usually make very little difference to our empirical findings in terms of either average industry
efficiency or rankings of individual firms, suggesting that the efficiency estimates are fairly robust to
differences in methodology. Another surprising result is that we also find substantial unexploited cost scale
economies for fairly large sizes of banks in the 1990s, suggesting a change from the 1980s.
Once the conceptual and measurement issues have been controlled for, it is important for the purposes
of public policy, research, and managerial performance to explain the remaining differences in efficiency
across banks. In a perfectly competitive or contestable market, one would expect inefficient firms to be driven
out by efficient firms, so that there would be only a residual level of inefficiency across firms remaining at
any given time. An empirical finding of substantial inefficiencies, therefore, raises the question as to whether
inefficiencies, which may have been sustainable in the past because of regulatory limits on competition, will
continue in the less-regulated future. For antitrust and merger analysis, it is important to know the effects of
market concentration and past mergers on banking efficiency. Similarly, it is important to know whether one
type of organizational form is more efficient than another, and whether inefficiency manifests itself in the form
of poor production decisions, risk management decisions, or both. We review the existing studies that
analyzed potential correlates of efficiency, but a comparison across studies is hampered by the fact that3
different samples, efficiency concepts, and measurement techniques were used. In our empirical analysis, we
explore the effects of a number of potential correlates of bank efficiency after controlling for efficiency
concept and measurement method. The potential correlates include measures of bank size, organizational form
and corporate governance, other bank characteristics, market characteristics, state geographic restrictions, and
federal regulator. We find
although many expected
expectations.
that a number of these factors appear to have independent influences on efficiency,
effects are not present and some of the effects we find are not consistent with
2. The Efficiency Concept—Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit Efficiency
A fundamental decision in measuring financial institution efficiency is which concept to use. This,
of course, depends on the question being addressed. We discuss here what we consider to be the three most
important economic efficiency concepts—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit efficiencies. We believe
these concepts have the best economic foundation for analyzing the efficiency of financial institutions because
they are based on economic optimization in reaction to market prices and competition, rather than being based
solely on the use of technology.
2.1 Cost Efficiency. Cost efficiency gives a measure of how close a bank’s cost is to what a best-
practice bank’s cost would be for producing the same output bundle under the same conditions. It is derived
from a cost function in which variable costs depend on the prices of variable inputs, the quantities of variable
outputs and any fixed inputs or outputs,
a cost function may be written as:
where C measures variable costs, w is
environmental factors, and random error, as well as efficiency. Such
(1)
the vector of prices of variable inputs, y is the vector of quantities of
variable outputs, z indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or outputs), which are included to
account for the effects of these netputs on variable costs owing to substitutability or complementarily with
variable netputs, v is a set of environmental or market variables that may affect performance, uC denotes an4
incorporates measurement error and luck that may temporarily give banks high or low costs. The inefficiency
factor uC incorporates both allocative inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs,
w, and technical inefficiencies from employing too much of the inputs to produce y. To simplify the
separable from the rest of the cost function, and both sides of (1) are represented in natural logs:
(2)
various X-efficiency measurement techniques (described in section 3.1) differ in how they distinguish the
We define the cost efficiency of bank b as the
estimated cost needed to produce bank b’s output vector if the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank
in the sample facing the same exogenous variables (w,y,z,v) divided by the actual cost of bank b, adjusted for
random error, i.e.,
(3)
The cost efficiency ratio may be thought of as the proportion of costs or resources that are used
efficiently. For example, a bank with Cost EFF of 0.70 is 70% efficient or equivalently wastes 30% of its
costs relative to a best-practice firm facing the same conditions. Cost efficiency ranges over (O, 1 ], and equals
one for a best-practice firm within the observed data.
l
2.2 Standard Profit Efficiency. Standard profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to
producing the maximum possible profit given a particular level of input prices and output prices (and other
lIn applications, efficiency is generally defined relative to the best practice observed in the industry,
rather than to any true minimum costs, since the underlying technology is unknown. (The usual form of the
stochastic frontier measurement technique is an exception.) Fortunately, for most economic hypotheses,
relative efficiency rather than absolute efficiency is the more appropriate concept. For example, we
investigate below whether larger versus smaller banks are more efficient, which requires only comparisons
to a consistent frontier.5
variables). In contrast to the cost function, the standard profit function specifies variable profits in place of
variable costs and takes variable output prices as given, rather than holding all output quantities statistically
fixed at their observed, possibly inefficient, levels. That is, the profit dependent variable allows for
consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs. Output prices are taken as
exogenous, allowing for inefficiencies in the choice of outputs when responding to these prices or to any other
arguments of the profit function.
The standard profit function, in log form, is:
(4)
We define standard profit efficiency as the ratio of the predicted actual profits to the predicted
maximum profits that could be earned if the bank was as efficient as the best bank in the sample, net of
random error, or the proportion of maximum profits that are actually earned:
(5)
ratio of 0.70 would indicate that, because of excessive costs, deficient revenues, or both, the firm is losing
about 30% of the profits it could be earning. Similar to the cost efficiency ratio. the profit efficiency ratio
multiplicatively separable in the profit function. A bank’s efficiency will vary somewhat with the values of
the exogenous variables, so for our efficiency estimates we average the values of the numerator and
denominator in (5) over the sample period before dividing to measure the average efficiency of the bank over
the sample period.6
equals one for a best-practice firm that maximizes profits for its given conditions within the observed data.
Unlike cost efficiency, however, profit efficiency can be negative, since firms can throw away more than
100% of their potential profits.
In our opinion, the profit efficiency concept is superior to the cost efficiency concept for evaluating
the overall performance of the firm. Profit efficiency accounts for errors on the output side as well as those
on the input side, and some prior evidence suggested that inefficiencies on the output side may be as large or
larger than those on the input side (e.g., Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993). Profit efficiency is based
on the more accepted economic goal of profit maximization, which requires that the same amount of
managerial attention be paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as to reducing a marginal dollar of costs.
That is, a firm that spends $1 additional to raise revenues by $2, all else held equal, would appropriately be
measured as being more profit efficient but might inappropriately be measured as being less cost efficient.
Profit efficiency is based on a comparison with the best-practice point of profit maximization within
the data set, whereas cost efficiency evaluates performance holding output constant at its current level, which
generally will not correspond to an optimum. A firm that is relatively cost efficient at its current output may
or may not be cost efficient at its optimal output, which typically involves a different scale and mix of outputs.
Thus, standard profit efficiency may take better account of cost inefficiency than the cost efficiency measure
itself, since standard profit efficiency embodies the cost inefficiency deviations from the optimal point.
3
2.3 Alternative Profit Efficiency.  An interesting recent development in efficiency analysis is the
concept of alternative profit efficiency, which may be helpful when some of the assumptions underlying cost
and standard profit efficiency are not met. Efficiency here is measured by how close a bank comes to earning
3A few prior papers have studied standard profit efficiency at U.S. banks (Berger, Hancock, and
Humphrey, 1993, DeYoung and None, 1996, Akhavein, Swamy, and Taubman, 1997, and Akhavein, Berger,
and Humphrey, 1997). The measured average profit efficiencies ranged from 24% of potential profits being
earned to 67%. Profit function estimation was also used to measure efficiency in terms of the risk-expected
return efficient frontier as defined in the finance literature (Hughes and Moon, 1995, Hughes, Lang, Mester,
and Moon, 1996a,b). A bank with too little expected profit for the amount of risk it is taking on is deemed
inefficient. Average efficiency in terms of the percent of expected profit being earned for a given level of
risk relative to the best practice banks was found to be around 85%.7
maximum profits given its output levels rather than its output prices. The alternative profit function employs
the same dependent variable as the standard profit function and the same exogenous variables as the cost
function. Thus, instead of counting deviations from optimal output as inefficiency, as in the standard profit
function, variable output is held constant as in the cost function while output prices are free to vary and affect
profits. The alternative profit function in log form is:
which is identical to the standard profit function in (3)
(6)
except that y replaces p in the function, f, yielding
As with standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency is the ratio of predicted actual profits
to the predicted maximum profits for a best-practice bank:
Here, efficiency values are allowed to vary in an important way with output prices, but errors in choosing
to the extent that the best-practice bank is not operating at the same (w,y,z,v) as bank b.
There would be no reason to estimate alternative profit efficiency if the usual assumptions held.
Standard profit efficiency and cost efficiency would appropriately measure how well the firm was producing
outputs and employing inputs relative to best-practice firms, given the underlying assumptions. However,
alternative profit efficiency may provide useful information when one or more of the following conditions
hold:
(i) there are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services;
(ii) outputs are not completely variable, so that a bank cannot achieve every output scale and product
mix;
(iii) output markets are not perfectly competitive, so that banks have some market power over the
prices they charge; and(iv)
8
output prices are not accurately measured, so they do not provide accurate guides to opportunities
to earn revenues and profits in the standard profit function.
The alternative profit function provides a way of controlling for unmeasured differences in output
quality, as in condition (i), since it considers the additional revenue that higher quality output can generate.
If output markets are competitive and customers are willing to pay for the additional services provided by
some banks, these banks should receive higher revenues that just compensate for their extra costs. Banks
would be sorted into market niches that differ by service quality or intensity, with customers who need or
prefer higher quality or more service paying more per dollar of their loan or deposit. Since the higher interest
rates or fees received by the higher quality providers just cover their extra production costs, these banks
survive in competitive equilibrium. For example. banks that take on more information-problematic loans
should charge higher interest rates or fees to cover their extra origination, monitoring, and control costs than
banks that lend to equally risky, but more informationally transparent borrowers. The alternative profit
function essentially replicates the cost function except that it adds revenues to the dependent variable. It
accounts for the additional revenue earned by high-quality banks, allowing it to offset their additional costs
of providing the higher service levels. So it does not penalize high-quality banks in terms of their efficiency
measure, whereas the cost function might. Thus, if banks do not have market power, alternative profit
efficiency should be thought of as a better measure of cost efficiency, rather than profit efficiency, since it
does not take into account any errors in the quantities of variable outputs.
4 Other methods of controlling for
differences in output quality are discussed in section 3.3 below.
Alternative profit efficiency might also prove useful if the variable outputs are not completely variable,
as in condition (ii) above. Banks differ in size by more than 1000-fold, even within the same local markets.
Most banks have fewer than $100 million in assets, yet they operate side-by-side with megabanks with over
$100 billion in assets. Clearly, a bank below $100 million cannot reach the size of a megabank except after
4Differences in output quality may also be partially captured in the standard profit function. However,
since it holds output prices fixed, the standard profit function is less able to account for differences in revenue
that compensate for differences in product quality, since these revenue differences may be partly reflected
in measured prices. Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1996) found that both standard and alternative profit
efficiencies helped control for differences in service quality in property-liability insurance industry.9
decades of growth and mergers and acquisitions, yet the standard profit function essentially treats these large
and small banks as if they should have the same variable outputs when facing the same input and output
prices, fixed netputs, and environmental variables specified in the standard profit function. Thus, unless the
(w,p,z,v) variables give a strong prediction about the size of the bank, a scale bias may occur in the standard
profit function, as larger banks have higher profits that are not explained by the exogenous variables. That
is, large banks may (arguably mistakenly) be labeled as having higher standard profit efficiency than smaller
banks, by virtue of the fact that small banks simply cannot reach the same output levels. This potential
problem does not occur to the same degree for the alternative profit function, since outputs are held constant
statistically. That is, alternative profit efficiency compares the ability of banks to generate profits for the same
levels of output and therefore reduces the scale bias that might be present in the standard profit efficiency
measure.
The alternative profit efficiency concept may also be helpful in situations in which the firms exercise
some market power in setting output prices, as in condition (iii). The standard profit function takes output
prices as given and embodies the assumption that the bank can sell as much output as it wishes without having
to lower its prices. This can lead to an understatement of standard profit efficiency for firms with output
below efficient scale, since these firms might have to reduce their prices to increase output and, therefore,
cannot earn as much as maximum potential profits as we measure it.
5
Under conditions of market power, it may be appropriate to consider output levels as relatively fixed
in the short run and allow for efficiency differences in the setting of prices and service quality. That is, an
optimizing bank will set each of its prices at the point where the market just clears for its output and choice
of service quality. Such a bank will also choose an optimizing service quality niche. Unlike the perfect
5Empirical studies have shown that banks with larger shares of the local market have some control
over prices, paying lower rates to small depositors (Berger and Hannan, 1989) and charging higher rates to
small borrowers (Hannan, 1991). These results are supported by studies that have tested price-taking versus
price-setting behavior for banks, most often finding the latter (Hancock, 1986, Hannan and Liang, 1993, and
English and Hayes, 1991). Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley (1996) estimated that about 68% of U.S. bank
revenues are from products competed for on a local basis and, therefore, could be subject to price-setting
behavior. However, it is not known how many of the prices of these products actually do contain significant
market power premiums.10
competition case considered above, a firm with market power may be able to increase revenues more than
costs by increasing service quality because there may not be other competitors or potential competitors at that
quality niche. It is also possible that the optimizing choice may be to economize on service quality and keep
costs relatively low. Alternative profit efficiency measures the extent to which firms are able to optimize in
their choices of prices and service quality, as well as their abilities to keep costs low for a given output level.
Alternative profit efficiency will also incorporate differences across firms in market power and their abilities
to exploit it, which is good for the owners of the bank, but is not a social good in the same way that the other
efficiencies are. Alternative profit efficiency may be viewed as a robustness check on standard profit
efficiency, which takes prices as fixed and allows outputs to be totally variable.
The measurement of alternative profit efficiency may also be motivated in part by inaccuracies in the
output price data, as in condition (iv) above. If the output price vector, p, is well measured, it should be
strongly related to profits and explain a substantial portion of the variance of profits in the standard profit
function. If prices are inaccurately measured—as is likely given the available banking data—the predicted
part of the standard profit function, f, in (4) would explain less of the variance of profits and yield more error
In this event, it may be appropriate to try specifying other
variables in the profit function that might yield a better fit, such as the output quantity vector, y, as in the
alternative profit function.
7
7One way to examine the problem of inaccurate price data is to determine the extent to which
measured prices help predict profits in the profit function. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) specified a bank
profit function with both prices, p, and quantities, y, included. A test of the joint hypothesis that all the p
parameters were zero was not rejected by the data, whereas the data did reject the hypothesis that all the y
parameters were zero. These results suggest that measured output prices do  not have the theoretically
predicted strong positive relationship with profits, and that output quantities do strongly predict profits,
perhaps in part reflecting the scale bias problem discussed above that output quantities are not completely
variable over the short term.
Another possible specification of the profit function would be to include neither output prices, p, nor
6There are good reasons to believe that output prices may be inaccurately measured in banking data.
Regulatory reports, such as the Call Report form, require accurate figures on balance-sheet quantities, but do
not directly measure prices. Rather, prices used in efficiency studies often must be constructed as ratios of
revenue flows to stocks of assets, which may incorporate noise due to differences in asset duration, risk,
liquidity, collateral, etc., as well as problems in matching revenue flows with the assets and time periods on
which they were earned.11
3. Efficiency Measurement Methods
Once the efficiency concepts are selected, the next issue is how to go about measuring them. Here
we explore four methodological choices—the estimation technique, the functional form specified (assuming
a parametric technique is chosen), the treatment of output quality, and the role of financial capital.
3.1 Estimation Techniques. The most common efficiency estimation techniques are data
envelopment analysis (DEA), free disposable hull analysis (FDH), the stochastic frontier approach, the thick
frontier approach, and the distribution-free approach.
8 The first two of these are nonparametric techniques
and the latter three are parametric methods. Berger and Humphrey (1997) reported roughly an equal split
between applications of nonparametric techniques (69 applications) and parametric methods (60 applications)
to depository institutions data.
Here, we focus on the parametric techniques primarily because they correspond well with the cost and
profit efficiency concepts outlined above. The nonparametric methods generally ignore prices and can,
therefore, account only for technical inefficiency in using too many inputs or producing too few outputs. They
cannot account for allocative inefficiency in misresponding to relative prices in choosing inputs and outputs,
nor can they compare firms that tend to specialize in different inputs or outputs, because there is no way to
compare one input or output with another without the benefit of relative prices. In addition, similar to the cost
function, there is no way to determine whether the output being produced is optimal without value information
on the outputs. Thus, the nonparametric techniques typically focus on technological optimization rather than
economic optimization, and do not correspond to the cost and profit efficiency concepts discussed above.
Another drawback of the nonparametric techniques is that they usually do not allow for random error in the
data, assuming away measurement error and luck as factors affecting outcomes (although some progress is
quantities, y. Efficiency would be measured relative to a frontier in which firms optimize over output prices,
quantities, and service quality jointly. As argued by Berger, Humphrey,
and Pulley (1997), such a specification would likely be too sparse to
individual banks and would also be subject to scale biases. It is essentially
and Pulley’s (1997) test of the y parameters in the profit function.
8See Mester (1994) for further description of these techniques.
and Pulley (1996) and Humphrey
describe the conditions faced by
rejected by the data in Humphreybeing made in this regard).
that random error is zero.
12
In effect, they disentangle efficiency differences from random error by assuming
Studies of U.S. banks that use nonparametric techniques report lower efficiency
means on average than those using parametric techniques (an average of 72% versus 84%) with much greater
variation (a standard deviation of 17% versus 6%), which could, in part, reflect some random error being
counted as variations in measured efficiency in these studies (Berger and Humphrey 1997, Table 2).
In the parametric methods, a bank is labeled inefficient if its costs are higher or profits are lower than
equations (2), (3), and (4), respectively, differ substantially from the best-practice values.
9 The methods differ
stochastic frontier approach and the distribution-free approach. As discussed below, the distribution-free
approach is our preferred technique.
In the stochastic frontier approach, the inefficiency and random error components of the composite
error term are disentangled by making explicit assumptions about their distributions. The random error term,
be one-sided (usually half-normally distributed). The parameters of the two distributions are estimated and
can be used to obtain estimates of bank-specific inefficiency. The estimated mean of the conditional
The distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach are fairly arbitrary. Two prior
studies found that when the inefficiencies were unconstrained, they behaved much more like symmetric normal
distributions than half-normals, which would invalidate the identification of the inefficiencies (Bauer and
Hancock 1993, Berger 1993).
10 As shown below, the data in the current study are often consistent with the
9In the typical application of the stochastic frontier approach, inefficiency is measured relative to the
estimated frontier, f, rather than the best-practice bank, i e., relative to a zero value for ln u, which is not
achieved by any firm in the sample. To make our efficiency measures comparable across techniques, we
normalize our stochastic frontier efficiency estimates to be deviations from the smallest observed expected
value of ln u, so that the most efficient bank in the sample has efficiency of one.
10Other distributions have also been used, e.g., normal–truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980, Mester,
1996, Berger and DeYoung, 1996), normal–gamma (Stevenson, 1980, and Greene, 1990), and13
presence of this potential problem—in many cases, the residuals are simply not skewed in the direction
predicted by the assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach.
If panel data are available, some of these maintained distributional assumptions can be relaxed, and
the distribution-free approach may be used. This method assumes that there is a core efficiency or average
efficiency for each firm over time. The core inefficiency is distinguished from random error (including any
temporary fluctuations in efficiency) by assuming that core inefficiency is persistent over time, while random
errors tend to average out over time. In particular, a cost or profit function is estimated for each period of
a panel data set. The residual in each separate regression is composed of both inefficiency, ln u, and random
3.2 Functional Forms for the Parametric Methods. We next consider the choice of a functional
form for the cost and profit functions, f, when one of the parametric methods is used to estimate efficiency.
The most popular form in the literature is the translog; however, it does not necessarily very well fit data that
are far from the mean in terms of output size or mix. McAllister and McManus (1993), and Mitchell and
Onvural (1996) showed that some of the differences in results on scale economies across studies may be due
to the ill-fit of the translog function across a wide range of bank sizes, some of which may be
underrepresented in the data.
normal–exponential (Mester, 1996).
11The reasonableness of these assumptions about the error term components depends on the length
of period studied. If too short a period is chosen, the random errors might not average out, in which case
random error would be attributed to inefficiency (although truncation can help). If too long a period is
chosen, the firm’s core efficiency becomes less meaningful because of changes in management and other
events, i.e., it might not be constant over the time period. Using 1984-94 data on U.S. commercial banks
and assuming a translog cost model, DeYoung (1997) showed that a six-year time period, such as we use
here, reasonably balanced these concerns.14
A more flexible functional form would help to alleviate this problem. The Fourier-flexible functional
form augments the translog by including Fourier trigonometric terms. It is more flexible than the translog and
is a global approximation to virtually any cost or profit function. Several studies have shown that it fits the
data for U.S. financial institutions better then the translog.
12 Berger and DeYoung (1996) found that measured
inefficiencies were about twice as large when the translog was specified in place of the Fourier-flexible form.
13
Here, we estimate the Fourier-flexible functional form and allow our cost and profit frontiers to vary each
year, but also evaluate the effects of switching to the translog by restricting the Fourier terms to be zero.
14
3.3 Output Quality. Theoretically, in comparing one bank’s efficiency to another’s, the comparison
should be between banks producing the same output quality. But there are likely to be unmeasured differences
in quality because the banking data does not fully capture the heterogeneity in bank output. The amount of
service flow associated with financial products is by necessity usually assumed to be proportionate to the dollar
value of the stock of assets or liabilities on the balance sheet, which can result in significant mismeasurement.
For example, commercial loans can vary in size, repayment schedule, risk, transparency of information, type
of collateral, covenants to be enforced, etc. These differences are likely to affect the costs to the bank of loan
origination, ongoing monitoring and control, and financing expense. Unmeasured differences in product
12See McAllister and McManus (1993), Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1996), Berger and DeYoung
(1996), Berger, Leusner, and Mingo (1996), and Mitchell and Onvural (1996). McAllister and McManus
(1993) also used kernel regression and spline estimation techniques to obtain better global properties.
13Other functional forms have also been specified. Mester (1992) estimated a hybrid translog
function, and Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993) estimated a Fuss normalized quadratic variable profit
function. Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996a,b) estimated a utility-maximization model based
on the Almost Ideal Demand System consisting of profit and input share equations. If risk neutrality is
imposed on this system, it corresponds to the standard translog cost function and input share equations.
14T0 further increase flexibility, one can allow the parameters being estimated to differ across banks
that may be using different production technologies, e.g., banks of different sizes, banks facing different
regulatory regimes, banks operating in different time periods, or different types of institutions. Numerous
studies have allowed the coefficients to vary according to whether the bank operates in a state that restricts
branching or a state that allows intrastate branching (e.g., Berger, 1993). Mester (1993) found a significant
difference in both the frontier parameters and parameters of the error term distribution in the stochastic
frontier method for mutual and stock-owned savings and loans. Most studies using the distribution-free
method allow the frontier parameters to vary over time. Akhavein, Swamy, and Taubman (1997) used
random coefficient estimation techniques, which allow each bank to have its own parameters.15
quality may be incorrectly measured as differences in cost inefficiency.
We have already discussed how the alternative profit function can help control for unmeasured
differences in output quality. Other studies took another approach and included variables intended to control
for the quality of bank output. For example, Hughes and Mester (1993), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon
(1996a,b) and Mester (1996) included the volume of nonperforming loans as a control for loan quality in
studies of U.S. banks, and Berg, Førsund, and Jansen (1992) included loan losses as an indicator of the quality
of loan evaluations in a DEA study of Norwegian bank productivity.
Whether it is appropriate econometrically to include nonperforming loans and loan losses in the bank’s
cost, standard profit, and alternative profit functions depends on the extent to which these variables are
exogenous. Nonperforming loans and loan losses would be exogenous if caused by negative economic shocks
(“bad luck”), but they could be endogenous, either because management is inefficient in managing its portfolio
(“bad management”) or because it has made a conscious decision to reduce short-run expenses by cutting back
on loan origination and monitoring resources (“skimping”).
15 Berger and DeYoung (1996) tested the “bad
luck,” “bad management,” and “skimping” hypotheses and found mixed evidence on the exogeneity of
nonperforming loans. In our empirical analysis below we attempt to solve this problem using the ratio of
nonperforming loans to total loans in the bank’s state. Our state average variable is almost entirely exogenous
to any individual bank, but allows us to control for negative shocks that may affect the bank.
3.4 The Role of Financial Capital. Another aspect of efficiency measurement is the treatment of
financial capital. A bank’s insolvency risk depends on its financial capital available to absorb portfolio losses,
as well as on the portfolio risks themselves. Insolvency risk affects bank costs and profits via the risk
premium the bank has to pay for uninsured debt, and through the intensity of risk management activities the
bank undertakes. For this reason, the financial capital of the bank should be considered when studying
15Of course, even if the level of nonperforming loans does reflect bank choice to some extent, it could
still be appropriate to include it in the cost and profit functions if it is thought to reflect a less frequent
decision on the part of the bank (e.g., credit policy) than production decisions. This is the same logic that
allows the output levels, which are ultimately endogenous variables chosen by the bank, to be included in
the cost and alternative profit functions.16
efficiency. To some extent, controlling for the interest rates paid on uninsured debt helps account for
differences in risk, but these rates are imperfectly measured.
Even apart from risk, a bank’s capital level directly affects costs by providing an alternative to
deposits as a finding source for loans. Interest paid on debt counts as a cost, but dividends paid do not. On
the other hand, raising equity typically involves higher costs than raising deposits. If the first effect
dominates, measured costs will be higher for banks using a higher proportion of debt financing; if the second
effect dominates, measured costs will be lower for these banks. Large banks depend more on debt financing
to finance their portfolios than small banks do, so a failure to control for equity could yield a scale bias.
The specification of capital in the cost and profit functions also goes part of the way toward
accounting for different risk preferences on the part of banks. The cost, standard profit, and alternative profit
efficiency concepts discussed in section 2 take as given that banks are risk neutral. But if some banks are
more risk averse than others, they may hold a higher level of financial capital than maximizes profits or
minimizes costs. If financial capital is ignored, the efficiency of these banks would be mismeasured, even
though they are behaving optimally given their risk preferences. Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995,
1996a,b) and Hughes and Moon (1995) tested and rejected the assumption of risk neutrality for banks.
Despite these arguments, only a few efficiency studies have included financial capital. Hancock (1985,
1986) conditioned an average-practice profit function on financial capital. Clark (1996) included capital in
a model of economic cost and found that it eliminated measured scale diseconomies in production costs alone.
The Hughes and Mester (1993, 1996) cost studies and the Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996a)
profit studies incorporated financial capital and found increasing returns to scale at large-asset-size banks,
unlike studies that did not incorporate capital. One possible reason is that large size confers diversification
benefits that allow large banks to have lower capital ratios than smaller banks. Akhavein, Berger, and
Humphrey (1997) controlled for equity capital and found that profit efficiency increases as a result of mergers
of large banks. Merged banks tend to shift their portfolios toward loans and away from securities for a given
level of equity. This could reflect diversification benefits available to merged banks—better diversification17
would allow the merged bank to manage better the increased portfolio risk with the same amount of equity
capital. In the efficiency estimates presented below, we incorporate financial capital in the cost and profit
function specifications.
4. Efficiency Correlates
Once we have controlled for the efficiency concepts and measurement methods used, and applied these
concepts and methods to the same data set, what explains the remaining differences in efficiency across banks?
The answer to this question has important implications for public policy, research, and bank management.
A useful first step is to explore the effects of a number of potential correlates of bank efficiency—various
bank, market, and regulatory characteristics that are at least partially exogenous to efficiency and so may help
explain the observed large differences in efficiency across banks. Several papers have performed analyses
along these lines.
16 A two-step procedure is typically used, whereby firm efficiency is estimated using one
of the techniques described above and is then regressed on, or tested for correlation with, a set of variables
describing the characteristics being investigated.
17
Some econometric issues make such analyses suggestive but not conclusive. First, the dependent
variable in the regressions, efficiency, is an estimate, but the standard error of this estimate is not accounted
for in the subsequent regression or correlation analysis. Second, none of the variables used in the regressions
is completely exogenous, and the endogeneity of any regressor can bias the coefficient estimates on all the
regressors. Even a characteristic like the identity of the bank’s primary federal regulator is somewhat
endogenous, since banks can change their charters. Endogeneity makes conclusions about causation
problematic. As an alternative to regression analysis, simple correlations are provided in some papers to
underscore the fact that causation may run in both directions.
l6Bank studies include Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka, and Rangan (1990), Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey
(1993), Pi and Timme (1993), Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas (1994), Berger and Hannan (1996), Kwan and
Eisenbeis (1995), Spong, Sullivan, and DeYoung (1995), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996a,b), and
Mester (1996); savings and loan studies include Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993),
Mester (1993), and Hermalin and Wallace (1994).
17The regressions are usually linear, but Mester (1993, 1996) used the logistic functional form, as the
stochastic frontier inefficiency estimates varied between zero and one.18
The different measurement techniques and efficiency concepts used and time periods and samples
studied make it difficult to compare the results of the regression analyses across studies. The potential
correlates used in the second-stage regressions also vary substantially across studies, sometimes because each
study has a particular focus—e. g., market structure, geographic diversification, or corporate control.
Most studies included the asset size of the institution, but no consistent picture emerges of its
relationship with efficiency.
18 Evidence on organizational form was also mixed.
19 There is weak evidence
that banks in holding companies are more efficient than independent banks.
20 The relationship between the
size of the CEO’s stock ownership and efficiency varies across studies.
21 There is limited evidence that banks
operating in more concentrated markets are less efficient, supporting the “quiet life” theory that inefficiency
has been sustainable in banking because competition has not been robust.
22
Most of the studies have found that well-capitalized banks and S&Ls are more efficient. This is
consistent with moral hazard theory that suggests managers of institutions closer to bankruptcy might be
inclined to pursue their own interests. But causation could run the other way—less efficient institutions have
lower profits, leading to lower capital ratios. Another fairly general finding among the bank studies is that
more efficient banks have lower levels of nonperforming loans, but as described above, nonperforming loans
likely have exogenous and endogenous components.
23 As this summary suggests, more work is needed before
18Hermalin and Wallace (1994) and Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas (1994) found a significant negative
relationship; Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993) found a significant positive relationship; and Aly,
Grabowski, Pasurka, and Rangan (1990), Berger and Hannan (1996), Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and
Hudgins (1993), Mester (1993 and 1996), and Pi and Timme (1993) found an insignificant relationship.
19Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993), and Hermalin and Wallace (1994) found
stock S&Ls more efficient than mutual S&Ls, while Mester (1993) found the reverse, likely because a later
sample period was examined.
20Mester (1996) found a significant correlation, but Spong, Sullivan, and DeYoung (1995) did not.
21Pi and Timme (1993) found a significant negative relationship, Berger and Hannan (1996) found
an insignificant negative relationship, and Spong, Sullivan, and DeYoung (1995) found a positive relationship.
22See Berger and Hannan (1996).
23We do not include financial capital and nonperforming loans in our analysis of correlates described
below, since we control for these in the cost and profit models from which our efficiency measures are19
a complete picture of financial institution efficiency emerges, and this paper tries to help complete the picture.
5. Empirical Design for Efficiency Estimation
This section outlines and compares the different econometric models used in the estimations below
and the assumptions that these models impose on the data. To facilitate exposition and keep the number of
comparisons under control, we choose a “preferred” model and measure the effects of deviations from this
model one at a time. That is, we choose what we believe to be the best set of variables, best cost and profit
function specification, and best frontier efficiency technique within our data and computational constraints and
then estimate the effects of making alternative choices one by one, in a controlled experiment. Note that our
“preferred” model would not be preferred by most or even necessarily many researchers. There is still
substantial disagreement over the best methods of estimation, but they do seem to be converging.
We estimate the efficiency of almost 6,000 U.S. commercial banks that were in continuous existence
with complete, accurate data over the six-year period 1990-95.
24 We will discuss here the variables,
specification, and estimation method of the preferred model, then briefly mention the alternatives that will be
explored in the empirical analysis below.
5.1 Variables Included in the Preferred Specifications of the Cost and Profit Functions. Table 1
gives the definitions of all the variables specified in the cost, standard profit, and alternative profit functions,
as well as their sample means and standard deviations for the most recent year of data, 1995. The variable
input prices, w, include the interest rates on purchased funds and core deposits as well as the price of labor.
Expenditures on these inputs comprise the vast majority of all banking costs. The variable outputs, y, include
consumer loans, business loans, and securities, the latter category being measured simply as gross total assets
less loans and physical capital, so that all financial assets are considered to be outputs. This specification of
financial assets as outputs and financial liabilities and physical factors as inputs is consistent with the
derived.
24Between 8,378 and 11,077 banks were used in estimating the cost and profit functions each year
1990-95, and the restrictions that all the cost and profit function data be complete for all years left 5,949
banks for which we report efficiencies. These banks had about half of the assets of the U.S. banking industry
as of December 1995.20
“intermediation” approach or “asset approach” to modeling bank production (Sealey and Lindley, 1977).
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We specify risk-weighted off-balance-sheet guarantees, physical capital, and financial equity capital
as fixed netputs, z. Off-balance-sheet guarantees are included in the model because they are often effective
substitutes for directly issued loans, requiring similar information-gathering costs of origination and ongoing
monitoring and control of the counterparties, and presumably similar revenues if these guarantees are
competitive substitutes for direct loans. The use of the Basle Accord risk weights implies that these guarantees
have approximately the same perceived (according to the Accord) credit risk and, therefore, approximately
the same origination, monitoring, and control costs as loans to these same parties. These guarantees are also
concentrated in large banks. As a consequence, a scale bias might be present if no account were taken of these
items, as larger banks would have disproportionately higher costs relative to their measured outputs. We
specify these guarantees as fixed instead of variable primarily because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate
output price information for use in specifying the standard profit function.
26
The treatment of physical capital as a fixed input is relatively standard in efficiency estimation, but
specification of equity is not. The reasons for including equity were discussed in section 3.4. As discussed
further in section 5.2 below, the specification of equity as fixed helps resolve several estimation problems.
Finally, the environmental variables, v, are limited to the nonperforming loan to total loan ratio either
for the bank (NPL) or for the state in which the bank is located (STNPL). In our preferred specification, we
use STNPL, since it is almost entirely exogenous
are not aware of any previous research in which
other measures of the economic conditions faced
and controls for bad luck in the bank’s environment. We
STNPL has been specified. In principle, v could include
by the bank, such as the growth or unemployment rate of
25In cost function models, deposits are specified as inputs, outputs, or as having both input and output
attributes. However, we cannot specify deposits as outputs here, since it would be too difficult to measure
an output price for deposits for use in the standard profit function. This is because deposit services are often
paid for by paying below-market rates on deposits rather than charging a positive price or fee for services.
26A prior study that specified a number of off-balance-sheet activities found that these activities had
little effect on cost scale and product mix economies (Jagtiani, Nathan, and Sick, 1995). However, we are
unaware of any frontier efficiency studies of either costs or profits that have taken these activities into
account.21
the state where the bank is located, but these variables are closely related to the state’s nonperforming loan
record and would make interpretation of the coefficients on NPL and STNPL more difficult. Additionally,
we could have included regulatory environmental variables such as state restrictions on branching or on bank
holding company expansion. We exclude regulatory information from the efficiency estimates because one
of our goals is to test how efficiency is related to these laws by treating them as potential correlates of
efficiency.
5.2 Functional Form of the Preferred Specifications. Our preferred model for estimating efficiency
specifies the Fourier-flexible functional form, which is a global approximation that includes a standard translog
plus Fourier trigonometric terms. For the cost function we specify:
where (yk/z3), (zr/z3), and the STNPL variables have 1 added for every firm in order to avoid taking the
natural log of zero, the xn terms, n= 1,...,7 are rescaled values of the ln (wi/w3), i=l, 2, ln (yk/z3), k=l, 2, 3,
here (not profits), and the standard symmetry restrictions apply to the translog portion of the function (i.e.,22
The standard and alternative profit functions use essentially the same specification with a few changes.
so that the natural log is taken of a positive number, since the minimum profits are typically negative. Thus,
alternative profit function, this is the only change in specification (other than relabeling the composite error
standard profit function, the terms containing the variable output quantities, ln (yk/z3), and their trigonometric
xn terms are replaced by the corresponding output prices, ln (pk/w3), and their xn trigonometric terms.
The Fourier-flexible form is a global approximation because the cos xn, sin xn, cos 2xn, sin 2xn, etc.,
approximating function closer to the true path of the data wherever it is most needed.
28 A good fit of the data
for the estimated efficient frontier is important in estimating efficiency, because inefficiencies are measured
as deviations from this frontier.
As shown in equation (8), all of the cost, profit, input price, and output price terms—including the
Fourier terms for prices before transformation—are normalized by the last input price, w3, in order to impose
linear homogeneity on the model. That is, on the efficient frontier, a doubling of all input prices exactly
approximation problems near the endpoints.
Fourier terms to include just the interactions of the own terms because of computational limitations in
applying the stochastic frontier approach below. The model as shown includes 122 net free parameters after
imposing symmetry. We exclude consideration of factor share equations embodying Shephard’s Lemma or
Hotelling’s Lemma restrictions because this would impose the undesirable assumption of no allocative
inefficiencies.
practice the Fourier terms have improved the fit of the data in every application of which we are aware.23
doubles costs, and a doubling of all input and output prices doubles standard profits.
29 This normalization is
the only way to impose homogeneity on the Fourier-flexible specification, since unlike the translog terms, the
Fourier terms are not multiplicative.
We specify all of the cost, profit, variable output quantities, and other fixed netput quantities as ratios
to the fixed equity capital input, z3, to control for heteroskedasticity, to help control for scale biases in
estimation, and to give the models more economic interpretation. Since the costs and profits of the largest
firms are many times larger than those of the smallest firms, large firms undoubtedly would have random
errors with much larger variances in the absence of the normalization. In contrast, firms of different sizes
have ratios of costs or profits to equity that typically vary only by a few-fold. This is particularly important
make the variance of the efficiencies dependent on bank size in the absence of normalization. Similarly, the
normalization of the variable output and fixed netput quantities keep these variables from being very skewed
for the large banks, so that the dependent and independent variables are roughly of the same order of
magnitude.
Normalization by equity also reduces the scale bias discussed in section 2.3 that is likely to be present,
particularly in the standard profit function. Large banks will tend to have higher profits for a given set of
prices, primarily because they were able to gain size over a period of decades, a feat that small banks cannot
achieve in the short run. However, the profits per dollar of equity and assets per dollar of equity of large
banks are well within the achievable range for small banks. Moreover, even in the short run, equity is often
the variable that limits bank size. Regulators and market participants generally tie the allowable size of the
bank, especially its loan portfolio, to its quantity of equity capital available to absorb loan losses.
Normalization by equity makes the dependent variable reasonably equally achievable for all banks.
Normalization by equity also has a particular economic meaning. The dependent variable in the profit
functions is essentially the return on equity, or ROE, achieved by the bank (normalized by prices and with
29The homogeneity restriction does not have to be imposed on the alternative profit function, but it
is imposed to keep the functional forms equivalent.24
a constant added), or a measure of how well the bank is using its scarce financial capital.
30 This measure may
be closer to the goal of the bank than maximizing the level of profits, particularly in banking, which is one
of the most highly financially levered industries. Shareholders are interested in their rate of return on equity,
which is approximated by ROE, and most debtholders do not put much pressure on banks to earn profits
because their returns are guaranteed by deposit insurance.
5.3 Preferred Frontier Efficiency Estimation Technique. Our preferred method of estimating
efficiency is the distribution-free approach, which disentangles the inefficiency term, ln u, from the random
and random errors tend to average out over time.
We briefly sketch the procedure as it is applied here. The cost, standard profit, and alternative profit
equations are estimated separately for each year, 1990-95, allowing the coefficients to vary to reflect changes
in technology, regulation, and market environment. The average residual for each bank b is formed, which
depending on the equation. Despite the assumption that random error
averages out to zero over time, we realize that the extreme values of these inefficiency estimates may reflect
substantial random components. Thus, we use truncation to reassign less extreme values to banks with the
most extreme values in each of ten bank size categories. We assign to each bank in the top and bottom 5%
of the distribution of the average residuals in a size category the value for the bank that is just at 5th or 95th
percentile, respectively. (Other degrees of truncation are also tried, as discussed below.) Truncation is
performed within size class deciles (by gross total assets) to reduce the effects of persistently good or bad luck
for these banks relative to firms of their size (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996). The resulting estimates of the
are then substituted into the formulas (5), (6), and (7) above, and the numerators and
30Unfortunately, our accounting measure of equity does not perfectly correspond to the market value
of the bank, but market values are unavailable for most banks.25
denominators are summed over the six years to estimate the efficiency ratios.
31
The distribution-free method gives a single set of cost, standard profit, and alternative profit efficiency
measures for each bank over the entire six-year period, 1990-95. Since it is likely that relative efficiencies
among the different banks shift somewhat over time because of changes in management, technical change,
regulatory reform, the interest rate cycle, and other influences, this method describes the average deviation
of each firm from the best-average-practice frontier. That is, our core efficiency estimates how well a bank
tends to do relative to its competitors over a range of conditions over time, rather than a firm’s relative
efficiency at any one point in time. Besides the fact that this method uses less arbitrary assumptions to
disentangle inefficiencies from random error, we believe that by averaging over a number of conditions, this
method gives a better indication of a bank’s longer-term performance and how it is likely to perform in the
future than any method that relies on a bank’s performance under a single set of circumstances.
5.4 Deviations from our Preferred Efficiency Measurement Methods.  We measure the effects
of several deviations from our preferred methods for measuring efficiency to determine the effects of some
of the assumptions commonly employed in the efficiency literature. By changing just one assumption at a
time, but leaving the data set and all other assumptions unchanged, we aim to isolate the individual effects.
The deviations we try are: (1) specifying the translog functional form in place of the preferred Fourier-flexible
specification, (2) trying several different specifications of the nonperforming loan ratios (NPL and STNPL),
(3) removing equity capital from the model, and (4) using the stochastic frontier approach in place of the
distribution-free approach.
6. The Empirical Results Pertaining to the Efficiency Concepts and Measurement Methods
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the efficiencies estimated in the preferred model
and in each variation, along with the rank-order correlations of the efficiencies from each variation with those
31Because the costs and profits in the dependent variables are expressed in terms of ratios to w3z3, the
cost or profit function. In order to offset the nonlinearities introduced by exponentiating and including the
profit for each year equals the average actual cost or profit for the same year.26
from the preferred model. The means and standard deviations are weighted by the denominators of the
efficiency ratios (estimated cost or potential profits) to represent the proportion of the entire sample’s resources
that are used efficiently or potential profits that are earned.
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6.1 Efficiency Estimates from the Preferred Model.
model of 0.868 suggests that about 13.2% of costs are wasted on
The mean cost efficiency from the preferred
average relative to a best-practice firm. The
0.868 figure is within the range found in the literature, but is slightly higher than the most typical finding of
about 80% cost efficiency. The slightly higher figure might be explained by the fact that we are examining
data from the first six years of the 1990s, rather than the 1980s, the period of study for most earlier work.
33
The mean efficiencies for the standard and alternative profit functions are similar to each other, both
showing that about half of the potential profits that could be earned by a best-practice firm are lost to
inefficiency. These figures are also well within the observed range from the few other profit efficiency
studies. The standard deviations of the profit efficiencies are about 20 percentage
efficiencies are quite dispersed, with many firms earning considerably more or
By contrast, the cost efficiencies are more tightly distributed with a standard
points.
points, suggesting that these
less than the average figure.
deviation of 6.2 percentage
We also note that the alternative profit function does not fit the data nearly as well as the standard
profit function. The average adjusted R
2 (not shown) of the cost, standard profit, and alternative profit
functions across the six years were 0.931, 0.607, and 0.329, respectively. Apparently, the measured prices
of the loan and security outputs are more closely related to the profit dependent variable than are the quantities
of these outputs. While a full investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems likely that at least part
32 The cost, standard profit, and alternative profit function coefficient estimates are available upon
request from the authors.
33 The reported efficiency estimates are based on 5% truncation of the average residuals, but other
degrees of truncation were also tried. The average measured cost efficiencies at the 0%, 1%, 5%, and 10%
truncation levels were 0.689, 0.784, 0.868, and 0.901, respectively. Thus, measured efficiency increases
considerably when the degree of truncation rises up to 5%, but the increase tapers off after this point. This
suggests that 5% truncation removes most of the random error not already eliminated by averaging over time.
Moreover, further truncation would not change the efficiency estimates by any economically meaningful
amount. Similar results obtain for the measured profit efficiencies.27
of the explanation may lie in differing degrees of service quality or market power. That is, if some banks are
providing service qualities that are more in demand and, therefore, are able to charge higher prices, or if some
banks are able to exercise market power to raise profits substantially through higher loan prices, this would
yield higher explanatory power for the standard profit function.
It is also noteworthy that the alternative profit efficiency ratios are lower on average than the standard
profit efficiency ratios. This finding again could be explained by service quality or market power
considerations. If, on average, banks are making poor service quality choices relative to the best-practice
banks, and these choices are reflected in lower output prices and revenues, the alternative profit efficiency
measures would correctly capture this source of inefficiency. Standard profit efficiency is less able to capture
the effects of service quality because it takes output prices as given (although they are imperfectly measured).
Similarly, if market power in setting output prices tends to explain profitability, the average bank may be
further from the alternative profit frontier than from the standard profit frontier, because the alternative frontier
does not control for output prices whereas the standard frontier does. Some evidence in favor of these
explanations is that the alternative profit efficiency ratio is much more highly correlated with output prices
than the standard profit efficiency ratio.
34 Thus, the firms measured as alternative profit inefficient receive
relatively low prices for their outputs, perhaps reflecting either low service quality or lack of market power.
6.2 Efficiency Estimates from Variations in Measurement Technique.  In the first variation on
our preferred model, the translog functional form is substituted for the preferred Fourier-flexible specification
by restricting the coefficients of all the trigonometric terms (the x’s in equation (8) above) to be zero.
35 The
results here suggest only a small difference in average efficiencies and very little difference in efficiency
dispersion or rank from using the more restricted specification. The average efficiencies are lower by about
All are statistically significant at the 1% level.
351f one of the specifications fits the data better than the other, it does not necessarily imply that
measured efficiency will either increase or decrease. See Berger and DeYoung (1996) for more discussion.
They found that the Fourier-flexible specification fit the data better and registered higher measured efficiency,
but the efficiencies from both specifications were highly correlated.28
1% of costs or potential profits in each case, with about the same degree of dispersion, and rank order
correlations of 0.979 or higher with the preferred specification.
Formal statistical tests indicate that the coefficients on the Fourier terms are jointly significant at the
1% level in all 18 cases—the cost, standard profit, and alternative profit functions in all six years. However,
the average improvement in goodness of fit or adjusted R
2 is relatively small. Thus, while the null hypothesis
of the translog form is rejected from a statistical viewpoint and the Fourier-flexible efficiency estimates are
likely more accurate, the improvement in fit is not significant from an economic viewpoint. Both functional
forms yield essentially the same average level and dispersion of measured efficiency, and both rank the
individual banks in almost the same order.
The next three variations in the table contain alternative specifications of nonperforming loans. In
contrast to our preferred model, which specifies the state’s nonperforming loan ratio in first- and second-order
logged terms [ ln STNPL and ½ (ln STNPL)
2], the next three specifications: (1) replace these terms with the
bank’s own ln NPL and ½ (ln NPL)
2; (2) include all of the STNPL and NPL terms; and (3) include none of
the STNPL or NPL terms. The efficiency estimates are strikingly similar across the four specifications
(including the preferred specification). The average efficiencies are all within 1 percentage point of each
other, the measured dispersion is virtually identical, and rank-order correlations are all over 99%. Apparently,
given the rest of our specification, the treatment of nonperforming loans is not materially important to the
efficiency estimates.
Nonetheless, the coefficients of the STNPL and NPL variables in the cost and profit functions (not
shown) did yield some insights as to which of the main hypotheses about the effects of nonperforming
loans—“bad luck,” “bad management,” or “skimping”—is most consistent with the data. For each of the cost
and profit equations, we formed the derivatives of the dependent variable with respect to STNPL and/or NPL
evaluated at the mean values of the data (not shown). The data primarily supported the “bad management”
hypothesis—i.e., that firms that are inefficient at managing their operations are also poor at managing their
loan portfolios. In almost every case, the derivative with respect to NPL was unfavorable (positive for costs,29
negative for profits) and statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, firms with loan performance
problems also tended to have high costs and low profits, consistent with the “bad management” hypothesis.
This occurred whether or not STNPL was specified in the same equation, which should remove much of any
“bad luck” effect. The derivative with respect to STNPL was often statistically significant in the predicted
direction at the 1% or 5% level, but was not as consistent as the results for NPL. Thus, the “bad luck”
hypothesis—under which exogenous conditions cause loan performance problems that raise costs—received
more limited support than the “bad management” hypothesis. The “skimping” hypothesis—under which
nonperforming loans may be associated with low costs from choosing to put less effort into loan monitoring
and control—was generally not supported by the data or its consequences were overwhelmed by “bad
management” effects. These results support our choice of specifying STNPL in the cost and profit functions
and excluding NPL.  STNPL appears to be a useful control variable for the bank’s economic environment and
is almost completely exogenous, whereas the inclusion of NPL likely adds an endogenous efficiency factor
that should not be controlled for when estimating efficiency.
In the next variation, the equity capital fixed input z3 is eliminated from the cost and profit functions.
There is little effect on the average level or dispersion of cost efficiency, although the firms are ranked slightly
differently, with a rank order correlation of 0.834 with the preferred model. More important, the average
profit efficiencies fell from means of about 50% of potential profits earned on average to about 10%, with a
much higher standard deviation and much lower rank-order correlation with the estimates from the preferred
specification. This is not unexpected. As discussed above, the specification of equity as a fixed input in the
preferred model reduces the scale bias that may be created by the fact that the equity capital of small banks
cannot be expanded to match that of large banks and allow them to expand their asset portfolios greatly except
after a period of decades. The dependent variable in this variation depends on the level of profits, which can
be much higher for large banks, as opposed to our preferred specification, where the dependent variable is a
function of the rate of return on equity, which is more comparable across size classes.
A breakdown of the measured profit efficiencies by size class when equity is removed (not shown)30
is consistent with these arguments. Banks with gross total assets below $50 million had mean measured
standard and alternative profit efficiencies of –0.068 and 0.020, respectively, whereas the corresponding
efficiencies for banks with over $10 billion were 0.768 and 0.783. Clearly, the removal of the equity control
variable rewards large banks that have high levels of profits by virtue of their equity positions that have been
built up over time, but these firms generally do not have particularly high rates of return on their equity. The
evidence from this variation strongly supports our specification of equity capital as fixed in the preferred
model.
The final variation shown in Table 2 uses the stochastic frontier approach where the inefficiencies are
assumed to be half-normally distributed. The data, however, do not appear to fit that distribution very well.
As described in the table, the skew of the data was not consistent with the half-normal assumptions in a
number of cases. As a result, we do not have any standard profit efficiency estimates, and the cost and
alternative efficiencies must be based on partial samples.
Despite these difficulties, the efficiencies estimated by the stochastic frontier approach are reasonably
consistent with those of the preferred distribution-free approach. The average cost efficiency is somewhat
higher with less dispersion, and the average alternative profit efficiency is somewhat lower with more
dispersion, but in both cases, the rank-order correlations with the distribution-free method are over 90%.
Overall, the results of Table 2 suggest that variations in methodology usually do not affect measured
efficiency substantially, except that profit efficiencies may be significantly scale biased when equity capital
is excluded. For the most part, the findings support the choices made in our preferred approach and give us
confidence to proceed from this point forward only with the estimates derived from the preferred model.
6.3 Cost Scale Economies in the Preferred Model. Table 3 shows cost ray scale efficiency by size
class and breaks out the X-efficiency by size class as well. Scale efficiency is defined as the ratio of predicted
minimum average costs to actual average costs, both adjusted to be on the X-efficient frontier, (i.e., setting31
X-efficiency ratios.
36 The variable t
* is the ratio of efficient scale to actual scale.
The basic result shown in Table 3 is that in every size class, the typical bank shows unexploited ray
scale economies—i.e., that the bank’s product mix could be produced at lower average cost by increasing the
scale of output. The mean scale efficiencies are around 80%, suggesting that approximately equal amounts
of resources are lost because of scale and X-inefficiencies. In every size class more than 90% of firms are
operating below efficient scale, and the mean t* is between 2 and 3 for each size class, suggesting that the
typical bank would have to be 2 to 3 times larger in order to maximize cost scale efficiency for its product
mix and input prices.
37
To ensure that our scale economies estimates reflect the shape of the frontier and are not simply the
consequence of correlation between the X-inefficiencies and scale, we reestimated the Fourier-flexible cost
model using only relatively efficient banks. We divided the banks into asset size deciles, chose the top 25%
of the distribution in terms of efficiency scores in each size class, reestimated the cost frontier model using
these banks, and then recomputed the scale measures. We got very similar results to those shown in Table 3.
38
These findings differ from most of those found using 1980s data, in which large banks were typically
found to be operating at constant returns to scale or with slight cost diseconomies of scale. In almost all cases,
cost scale economies were exhausted well below $10 billion in assets .
39 The difference could have occurred
because of some of the differences in specification between our cost function and those typically employed
in the literature. One candidate is our use of the Fourier-flexible function form in place of the more common
36The standard profit efficiencies are already inclusive of scale efficiency. We do not compute scale
efficiencies for the alternative profit function because they would include economies on the consumer side,
and would not be comparable (see Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996).
37As shown in Table 3, unexploited scale economies are actually somewhat larger for banks in the
larger size classes. This would be consistent with the hypothesis that larger banks choose product mixes that
are more conducive to large scale.
38The weighted average scale efficiency across all banks in this estimation was 0.815, the weighted
average t
* was 1.854 (significantly greater than 1), and a weighted average of 93.5% of bank costs were
incurred by banks that were operating below efficient scale.
39Exceptions include Hunter and Timme (1986), Shaffer and David (1991), Shaffer (1994), Hughes,
Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996a), and Hughes and Mester (1996).32
translog specification. The translog forces a symmetric U-shape in logs on the ray average cost frontier, which
could force measured scale diseconomies on the large banks as the imposed reflection of the scale economies
found for small banks. However, this does not appear to be the case here. We reestimated the scale
economies using the translog (not shown) and found that, if anything, the measured scale economies for the
larger banks were even greater. Another candidate is our use of equity capital. Failure to control for equity
could give a bias toward finding cost scale diseconomies, because large banks tend to have lower equity ratios
and pay interest on higher portions of their funds. Reestimation without specifying equity capital (not shown)
did reduce our measured scale economies for large banks, consistent with the expected bias, but it did not
eliminate them. The last column of Table 3 reports the results of another robustness check of these scale
economy findings. We examined the raw data without imposing a specification. The ratio C/GTA, average
cost per dollar of assets, falls consistently when moving into larger size classes. This simple measure is, if
anything, biased against the larger banks, which typically have more off-balance-sheet guarantees and more
loans per dollar of assets, which should raise average costs. The finding of declining cost per dollar of assets
by size class strongly supports our scale economy findings. Moreover, an examination of the ratio C/GTA
for banks over the 1980s reveals mild scale economies for asset levels below $1 billion and diseconomies for
larger banks, which is consistent with the prior scale economies literature. This suggests that the 1990s are
indeed different, and that our methodology has not created the result.
An important caveat to the scale efficiency findings is that they may not hold for the very largest
banks. We group the data from all banks with GTA greater than $10 billion into a single size class in Table 3
because there are too few very large banks in the U.S. to form credible size subclasses of this largest size
class, and our data exclusion rules exacerbated the problem by dropping several of these banks. To try to
ameliorate this problem, we recalculated the C/GTA ratio in the last column of Table 3 including all U.S.
banks (regardless of our data exclusion rules), and segmented the largest size class into $10 billion -$25
billion, $25 billion -$50 billion, and above $50 billion ranges. We find average costs to be decreasing in all
size classes up through $25 billion, with an increase in average costs thereafter. Thus, we still find relatively33
robust evidence of scale economies well beyond the region usually found in studies using the 1980s data.
Serious estimates of scale economies for U.S. banks over $25 billion will likely have to wait for the
consolidation of the industry to create enough of these large banks to yield reasonable estimates.
Our scale economy results suggest that some conditions changed between the 1980s and 1990s that
substantially raised the cost-efficient scale of U.S. banks. While a complete investigation is beyond the scope
of this paper, three explanations seem plausible. First, open-market interest rates have been relatively low
recently—the one-year U.S. Treasury rate averaged 9.74% in the 1980s and 5.39% over our sample period
of 1990-1995. It is quite likely that these low rates reduced interest rate expenses (which account for most
of costs) proportionally more for large banks than small banks, because a greater proportion of large banks’
liabilities tend to be market-sensitive. Large banks often rely on wholesale purchased funds that pay market
rates, whereas small banks typically rely more on core deposits with rates that do not vary one-for-one with
open-market rates. Under this explanation, the scale economies of the early 1990s may be a temporary
phenomenon that will disappear if and when market rates rise substantially. To partially check this
explanation, we reevaluated each bank’s scale economies as if interest rates were at their levels in the 1980s.
40
We still find scale economies (although they are slightly lower), suggesting that a rise in interest rates back
to the higher levels of the 1980s would not eliminate the scale economies. We acknowledge, however, that
our interest-rate experiment is subject to the Lucas critique. Namely, the cost function was estimated for the
low interest rate environment of the 1990s. Because rates are low, banks might be paying less attention to
optimizing with respect to interest rates. As interest rates rise, the parameters of the cost function could
change in a way that affects scale economies significantly.
A second possible explanation for our scale economies result is that recent regulatory changes may
have tended to favor large banks relative to small banks. In particular, the elimination of geographic
40In particular, for each bank in the sample that had at least nine years of data for the 1980s, we
calculated the average interest rate the bank paid on purchased funds and core deposits in the 1980s and the
average interest rates it paid for these funding sources in the 1990s, and found the differences in average rates
paid. We then added each bank’s difference to its core deposit rate in each year in the 1990s and recalculated
the bank’s scale economies at this new evaluation point. On average, this added 2.55% to the purchased
funds rate and 2.50% to the core deposit rate.34
restrictions on bank branching and holding company expansion during the 1980s and into the early 1990s may
have removed some scale diseconomies and made it less costly to become large. For example, in the extreme
case of unit banking, there are very severe diseconomies to becoming large without being able to have any
branch offices to collect deposits, and such diseconomies would be removed by allowing statewide
branching.
41 Similarly, the removal of interest rate ceilings on core deposits during the 1980s likely raised
costs more for small banks, which rely more on core deposits for their funding.
Finally, improvements in technology and applied finance may have reduced costs more for large banks
than for small banks. Improvements in information processing and credit scoring may have reduced the costs
of extending small business loans and credit card loans more for larger banks. Similarly, improved automation
may have allowed large banks to expand faster and at lower cost by setting up ATM machines in place of
adding more expensive brick-and-mortar branch offices. Large banks may have also been better positioned
to take advantage of the new tools of financial engineering, such as derivative contracts and other off-balance-
sheet activities.
6.4 Comparison of Efficiency Across Concepts. Table 4 shows the rank-order correlations among
the different X-efficiency measures and some other commonly used financial ratios that may be considered
raw-data measures of efficiency. Standard and alternative profit efficiency are highly positively and
measured cost efficiency is essentially uncorrelated with standard profit efficiency and it is negatively
correlated with alternative profit efficiency.
One possible explanation is that cost and revenue inefficiencies may be negatively related, so that
firms with low cost efficiency tend to have high revenue efficiency that offsets it. This could occur because
of competitive pressures if, for example, firms with highly valued product mixes or high revenue efficiency
feel less market discipline to control their costs.
41Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) found that bank performance measured several different ways
improved after within-state branching restrictions were removed, although they did not separate the
improvement into scale and X-efficiency effects.35
An alternative explanation is that much of what are measured as cost inefficiencies are actually
unmeasured differences in product quality that required additional costs to create. As discussed above, the
alternative profit function and to a lesser extent the standard profit function tend to control for product quality
implicitly by letting revenues received for higher quality offset the extra costs of creating the quality. We will
explore this possibility more in the next table, where we compare cost and profit inefficiencies.
The correlations between the efficiencies and each of the raw-data measures follow the expected
pattern—efficiency by any definition is negatively and significantly correlated with the standard average cost
ratio C/GTA and positively and significantly correlated with the standard profitability ratios ROA and ROE.
These findings suggest that our efficiency measures are robust and are not simply the consequences of our
specifications or methods.
As measured, the cost and profit efficiency ratios are not directly comparable because they are reported
in terms of different denominators (predicted actual costs versus potential profits). In Table 5, we report the
dollar values of the cost, standard profit, and alternative profit inefficiencies divided by the same
denominators—potential profits, gross total assets, and equity. The meanings of these ratios are the
proportions of potential profits lost, the loss of ROA, and the loss of ROE, respectively, because of
inefficiency. These ratios may provide evidence on the extent to which the measured cost inefficiencies
incorporate unmeasured differences in product quality. If markets are competitive so that differences in
product quality are rewarded with higher revenues that cover the costs, the alternative profit inefficiency
essentially just improves on cost efficiency by offsetting the extra costs of producing higher quality with
higher revenues. In this event, the alternative profit inefficiency ratios measured here would be expected to
be smaller than the cost inefficiency ratios. If instead, the effects of market power in pricing bank outputs
are more important, alternative profit inefficiency may be larger than both cost inefficiency and standard profit
inefficiency, as firms with the most market power are measured as much more alternative-profit efficient than
the average bank.
The empirical results suggest that this market power paradigm appears to dominate any effects of36
unmeasured differences in product quality on measured efficiency. Alternative profit inefficiency is larger
than are both cost and standard profit inefficiencies. This does not suggest that unmeasured differences in
product quality are unimportant, just perhaps less important than market power considerations in determining
bank profits. These results also suggest that the standard assumption of perfect competition in setting output
prices maintained for measuring standard profit efficiency may be violated by the data.
7. Empirical Investigation of the Potential Correlates of Efficiency
The last part of our analysis relates our efficiency estimates to various aspects of the banks, their
markets, and their regulation that are potential correlates of efficiency, i.e., factors that are at least partially
exogenous and may explain some of the efficiency differences that remain after controlling for efficiency
concept and measurement method. Here, we use the three distribution-free X-efficiency measures estimated
for the 1990-95 period and the average values of the bank, market, and regulatory characteristics over 1990-
95. As we did when estimating efficiency, we also investigate a few alternative specifications of the potential
correlates to check robustness.
The characteristics we investigate are given in Table 6, where we show their definitions, means and
standard deviations over 1990-95. These variables fall into six broad categories: bank size, organizational
form and corporate governance, other bank characteristics, market characteristics, state geographic
restrictions on competition, and primary federal regulator.
We performed both multiple regressions and single variable regressions. Including an endogenous
variable in a multiple regression can bias the coefficients even on the exogenous variables, and perhaps all
of our variables are partly endogenous and partly exogenous. Thus, in addition to the multiple regressions,
we also ran regressions that each included a constant term and a single explanatory variable. These single-
variable regression coefficients are proportional to correlation coefficients. A disadvantage of these single
variable regressions is that any significant correlation found might be spurious, with both efficiency and the
included variable being significantly related to a third, omitted factor. Because the multiple and single
regression analyses each has advantages and disadvantages, we will be conservative and tend to draw37
conclusions only when the coefficients in both are statistically significant and of the same sign. These results
are shown in Table 7.
7.1 Bank Size. The bank size variables (SMLBANK, MEDBANK, LARBANK, HUGBANK) are
measured with dummy variables to allow for nonmonotonicity and nonlinearities in the relationship between
bank size and efficiency. We specified our multiple regression equation without a constant term and included
all four of these size variables.
42 As shown in Table 7, the cost efficiency estimates do not vary much across
size classes—holding all else equal, the cost efficiency is about 2.5% higher at the largest banks (with assets
over $10 billion) than the smallest banks (with assets under $100 million). But in terms of profit efficiency
(both standard and alternative), small banks show the greatest level of efficiency. This result suggests that
our profit efficiency measures display very little of the potential scale biases favoring larger firms discussed
above (as long as equity capital is specified). The cost and profit efficiency results together seem to imply
that as banks grow larger, they are equally able to control costs, but it becomes harder to efficiently create
revenues. This is consistent with conventional wisdom and the historical fact that small banks typically have
higher profitability ratios. It also helps explain the lack of a positive correlation between cost efficiency and
profit efficiency discussed above.
7.2 Organizational Form and Corporate Governance.  The banking industry is consolidating at
a rapid pace, so it is important to determine the efficiency effects of bank mergers and acquisitions. Our
results indicate that, all else equal, banks that have survived at least one merger over our sample period
(MERGED) have higher standard and alternative profit efficiency than other banks, which is consistent with
prior findings discussed above. This result is not confirmed, however, in the single variable regressions, where
alternative profit efficiency is significantly lower for banks that have been involved in mergers. This is
perhaps because being involved in a merger is correlated with bank size, and size is negatively related to
alternative profit efficiency. On the other hand, being acquired by another holding company (ACQUIRED)
does not appear to be associated with profit efficiency, but is associated with higher cost efficiency. All in
42We excluded one of the state branching dummy variables (STATEB) and one of the primary federal
regulator dummy variables (OCC) to avoid perfect collinearity in the regressions.38
all, these results are fairly mixed.
Banks with complicated organizational forms or internal management structures could be less efficient,
but a holding company structure might also impose some discipline on banks, so we explored the relationships
between efficiency and whether the bank is in a bank holding company (INBHC), whether the holding
company is multilayered (MUL_LAY), and whether the top-tier holding company is located out of state
(OUTST), which could make control more difficult. Banks in holding companies tend to have higher levels
of profit efficiency (both standard and alternative) than independent banks, and their cost efficiency is
significantly greater as well, consistent with some previous cost efficiency studies. If the holding company
has multiple layers, this means even higher levels of profit and cost efficiency. Thus, the more complex
structure of multilayered holding companies does not appear to be harming bank efficiency. Having the
highest holding company owner from out of state also is associated with higher, not lower, cost efficiency.
A potential explanation for these results may be a form of the efficient structure hypothesis (Demsetz,
1973)—more efficient banking organizations may tend to acquire other banks, and the multilayer, multistate
holding company is the vehicle that allows them to do it.
We also included a variable indicating whether the bank’s highest holder is registered with the SEC
for public trading (PUB_TRADED). To the extent that outside shareholders can exert control over bank
management, we might expect publicly traded banks to be more efficient, all else equal, and this is indeed
what our results indicate. Publicly traded firms tend to have both higher cost and standard profit efficiencies.
For 126 of the banks we have information from 1987-88 on the proportion of stock owned by insiders,
i e., board members and their relatives (INSIDE) and the proportion of stock owned by outsiders who had
more than 5% of the outstanding shares (OUTSIDE).
43 So in an alternative specification with the more limited
number of observations (not shown in Table 7), we also included the first- and second-order terms of these
two variables [INSIDE, ½ INSIDE
2, OUTSIDE, and ½ OUTSIDE
2]. We included the second-order terms
because Gorton and Rosen (1995) predict a U-shaped relationship between insiders’ stock holdings and
43We thank Gary Gorton and Rich Rosen for providing these data.39
efficiency. At low levels of inside ownership, a negative relationship would be consistent with managers who
have greater control pursuing their own interests, which may involve inefficiencies. However, at higher stakes,
an increase in insider ownership may serve to align management’s objectives with those of owners, yielding
greater efficiency. We include the OUTSIDE variables, since outside investors can be a controlling influence,
and the more stock in the hands of large, outside investors, the more control these investors can be expected
to exert and the more efficient the bank might become. However, in none of our regressions are any of these
governance variables significantly related to efficiency.
7.3 Other Bank Characteristics. We also explored the effects of other characteristics of the bank.
A bank’s age (AGE) might be related to efficiency since bank production might involve “learning by doing”
(Mester, 1996). While significantly different from zero in our profit efficiency regressions, the coefficient on
AGE is very small in all the regressions.
We included several variables to control for the strategic niche of the bank, including proxies for the
amount of risk the bank is taking on. Banks with higher loan-to-asset ratios (LOAN/GTA) tend to have higher
profit efficiency. This might reflect that banks’ loan product is more highly valued than securities, or it could
reflect higher market power that exists in loan markets compared to the other product markets in which banks
operate. Whether a bank is heavily using derivative contracts, such as swaps, forwards, and futures
(SUB_DER), does not appear to be consistently related to its efficiency. This might be because of
heterogeneity in the uses of these instruments, which can be used for both hedging and speculative purposes.
Reliance on purchased funds (PF/GTA) could also be related to efficiency, since the cost of purchased funds
differs from that of core deposits over the business cycle. We find that banks that use more of these funds
tend to have lower profit efficiencies than other banks.
As a direct measure of bank risk, we included the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA).
To the extent that we are not adequately controlling for risk taking in our profit models, riskier banks may
be more profit efficient if they are trading off between risk and return. Alternatively, banks that are poor at
operations might also be poor at risk management, which would imply a positive relationship between profit40
and/or cost efficiency and risk. The evidence suggests that banks with more variable returns tend to have
lower profit efficiencies (in the multiple regressions) and also lower cost efficiencies, consistent with the
notion that bad managers are poor at both operations and risk management. A negative relationship with cost
efficiency was also found when we replaced SDROA with the standard deviation of the return on book equity
(SDROE) as a robustness check.
7.4 Market Characteristics.  The next set of variables characterizes the competitive conditions of
the markets in which the banks operate. The Herfindahl index (HERF) measures the degree of local deposit
market concentration and proxies for the bank’s market power. As might be expected, market power is
negatively related to cost efficiency but positively related to alternative profit efficiency. Banks in less
competitive markets can charge higher prices for their services but might feel less pressure to keep costs down
(i.e., enjoy the “quiet life”).
44 We included two other variables related to market competition. INMSA
indicates whether the bank is located in a metropolitan area, which may be more competitive than a rural area.
The results are not consistent across the multiple and single variable regressions, because INMSA is likely
correlated with other aspects of the bank, like its size, merger activity, etc. State income growth (STGROW)
proxies for the growth of market demand for banking services. Greater demand might allow for less cost
efficient production, at least in the short run before new competitors enter, but more profit efficiency, since
it means greater opportunity to make profit. This is what our estimates show.
45
7.5 State Geographic Restrictions on Competition. Geographic restrictions on bank expansion,
which differ across states, can also limit the competitive forces banks face. We included variables to control
for the degree of branching restrictions (UNITB, LIMITB, STATEB), the degree of in-state holding company
expansion permitted (LIMITBHC), whether out-of-state holding company expansion is allowed or not
44However, this result is not robust to replacing HERF with SHARE, the bank’s share of local market
deposits, as SHARE is significantly positively related to cost efficiency.
45As a robustness check we replaced STGROW with the state unemployment rate (STUNEMP), which
is negatively related to market demand. Here the results are much weaker, and the signs on STUNEMP in
the profit regressions are positive, indicating a negative relationship between market demand and profit
efficiency.41
(NOINTST), and the proportion of the banking industry’s assets held in any states that are allowed to enter
(ACCESS). These variables are meant to control for the degree of competition or contestability of the bank’s
market. Perhaps the most surprising finding here is that the relationship between branching restrictions and
efficiency does not appear to be monotonic in the severity of the restrictions. We find some support that banks
in states with limited branching restrictions have higher cost efficiency and lower profit efficiency than banks
in either unit banking states or states without branching restrictions; banks in unit banking states appear to be
the least cost efficient but most profit efficient. The other variables included to measure geographic
restrictions produce no consistently significant results, except that banks in states that prohibit interstate
expansions (NOINTST) appear to be less cost efficient than banks in states that permit such expansions. In
summary, efficiency does seem to be related to limits on geographic expansion, but the findings are somewhat
inconsistent.
7.6 Federal Bank Regulator. Our last group of variables—the identity of the bank’s primary federal
regulator—helps account for some control for the regulatory regime banks are facing. The regulator, like the
market, exerts some control over the bank and thus might be related to bank efficiency. Also, the bank’s
primary federal regulator (FED, OCC, or FDIC) varies depending on the type of charter the bank has; thus,
the variables might reflect differences in banks with different charters. We find only weak relationships
between regulator identity and our three efficiency measures, with banks overseen by the Federal Reserve
tending to be more cost efficient than banks overseen by the OCC or FDIC.
7.7 Fit of the Correlates Equations. A final observation from Table 7 is that the adjusted R
2
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suggest that we have not explained most of the variance in measured efficiency. Our 25 explanatory variables
are able to explain about 7% of the variance of measured cost efficiency and about 35% of the variance of
the two types of measured profit efficiency. We make no judgment as to whether these figures are high or
low, but simply note that most of the variance in measured efficiency after controlling for efficiency concept
and measurement methods remains unexplained. It may be due to essentially unmeasurable factors, such as
differences in managerial ability, to potential correlates of efficiency that we could have included but failed42
to do so, or to measurement error in the dependent variable due to the many difficulties in measuring
efficiency. Further investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Conclusion
Despite the very significant research effort that has been mounted over the last few years examining
the efficiency of financial institutions, there is as yet little information and no consensus on the sources of the
substantial variation in measured efficiency, i.e., these sources remain a “black box.” Here, we focus on
getting inside the box by examining a number of sources, holding the data set constant. We examine three
types of sources: (1) differences in the efficiency concept used, (2) differences m efficiency measurement
methodology within the context of these concepts, and (3) the potential correlates of efficiency that may
explain some of the efficiency differences that remain after controlling for efficiency concept and measurement
method. We review the literature on the sources of efficiency at commercial banks and provide new evidence
using a large data set of almost 6,000 U.S. commercial banks that were in continuous operation over the six-
year period 1990-95.
We examine three economic efficiency concepts—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit
efficiencies. Each corresponds to how well a firm performs relative to a different economic optimization
program, and so each may provide different insights about firm efficiency. Consistent with this expectation,
we find that measurement of each of the efficiency concepts does add some independent informational value.
In fact, the measures of profit efficiency are not positively correlated with cost efficiency, even though all
three efficiency measures are positively related to some raw-data measures of performance. As well, a number
of the potential correlates had different relationships with the three different efficiency measures, again
suggesting that each is measuring a different type of optimization. These results suggest that future researchers
might consider measuring all three concepts to be sure that any conclusions about which firms are most
efficient or which potential correlates succeed in “explaining” efficiency are robust with respect to all three
economic efficiency concepts.
We explore the effects of a number of different efficiency measurement methods on each of the three
efficiency concepts. These methods include the use of different measurement techniques, different functional43
forms, and various treatments of output quality and financial capital. The results for each of the efficiency
concepts are quite robust. We find that the choices made concerning measurement technique, functional form,
and other variables usually make very little difference in terms of either average industry efficiency or the
rankings of individual firms in our data set. An exception is the treatment of equity capital. Failure to
account for the equity position of a bank seems to yield a strong scale bias, making large banks appear to be
more efficient than small banks by virtue of the equity they have built up over time.
We also find substantial unexploited cost scale economies for our 1990s data up to bank sizes much
larger than typically found in the past. This might have occurred because the decline in interest rates,
regulatory changes such as the liberalization of intrastate and interstate banking, and improvements in
technology and applied finance since the 1980s may have tended to favor large banks over small banks.
Our analysis of the potential correlates of bank efficiency cover a number of bank, market, and
regulatory characteristics using multiple- and single-variable regressions. The results are quite mixed. Some
of the potential correlates of efficiency have the predicted sign and statistical significance; others have little
independent influence on efficiency; and some have unexpected or mixed signs. Importantly, most of the
variance in measured efficiency for each of the efficiency concepts remains unexplained, because of
unmeasured factors such as differences in managerial ability, potential correlates that were inadvertently
excluded from the analysis, or measurement error in the efficiency dependent variables. We leave to future
research the task of better explaining efficiency or determining that not much more can be explained.
We close with a caveat that the empirical results of this study should not be taken too seriously unless
confirmed by future research. To our knowledge, this is the first study of the efficiencies of the first six years
of the 1990s, the first to compare cost, standard profit, and alternative profit efficiency of banks using a single
data set and consistent specifications, the first to evaluate the effects of so many differences in methodology,
and the first to use such a comprehensive set of potential correlates of efficiency. It is quite likely that some
of these results will differ in future studies of these data that use different sets of assumptions.44
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